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Abstract 
 
 
Keith Campbell and Jonathan Schaffer propose an ontology in which entities consist in collocated 
collections of tropes, and tropes are individuated by location. This would imply that immaterial entities 
are not possible. In this paper, I attempt to subvert this materialist conclusion by giving two arguments 
against the key individuation principle it requires. I show that the locational individuation principle can 
be formulated so as to survive the first, but not the second argument. 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Keith Campbell has defended a trope theory of properties in his paper “The Metaphysic 
of Abstract Particulars.”1 This trope theory is a fundamentally realist theory of 
properties.2 It is to be distinguished from a universalist theory of properties because 
each property, on the trope theory, is taken to be a particular entity. If I have two red 
pencils A and B, the trope theory takes the redness of A and the redness of B to be 
distinct individuals. By contrast, the universalist theory of tropes takes the redness of A 
and the redness of B to be merely instances of the same thing. The dispute between 
trope theorists and universalists then is over whether properties are one entity, multiply 
realized and located, or many entities which simply resemble.  
Campbell gives several arguments in support of his trope theory. He argues that tropes 
are required for the analysis of causation. He argues that tropes help to solve issues in 
the philosophy of perception, the problem of concrete individuals, and the philosophy 
of change. He also argues that tropes are suggested by our current best physical 
theories, specifically General Relativity. I don’t propose to say anything about these 
arguments here. Rather, I will discuss an argument Campbell makes against the 
                                                          
1 Campbell, Keith (1981). “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars.” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 6 (1): 477-488. 
2 Though Campbell does not explicitly state this in his paper, I take him only to be defending a 
realist theory of the sparse conception of properties. Nothing in this paper turns on this point. 
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possibility of non-spatiotemporal entities, or at least certain kinds of non-
spatiotemporal entities. I hope to challenge Campbell’s argument by casting doubt on 
the key individuation principle required by the argument. 
 
II. The Materialist Argument  
 
I quote Campbell in summary of his argument:  
 
It is through location that tropes get their particularity. Further, they are 
identified, and distinguished from one another, by location. […] So the theory 
seems to be committed to the thesis that every reality is a spatio-temporal one. 
This would make a clean sweep of transcendent gods, Thomist angels, Cartesian 
minds, Kantian noumena, and Berkeley’s entire ontology. (486) 
 
It seems that we can lay out Campbell’s argument as follows:  
(1) Tropes are individuated by location. (PR)  
(2) There cannot be tropes that are not located. (1)  
(3) Immaterial entities are constituted by tropes. (PR)  
(4) Immaterial entities are not located. (Def)  
(5) If x is not located, then no trope constituting x is located. (PR)  
(6) No trope constituting any immaterial entity is located. (3,4,5)  
(7) There cannot be any immaterial entities. (2,6)  
 
The premises of this argument seem fairly plausible, given Campbell’s trope theory.3 
(3) is a straightforward consequence of the view that every entity is constituted by a 
bundle of tropes. (5) is true because any trope located at a spacetime point p, if it were a 
part of an immaterial entity, would thereby locate that entity at p, violating the criteria 
for immateriality given in (4). 
  
                                                          
3 The move from (1) to (2) actually deserves closer examination. All that strictly seems to follow 
from (1) is:  
(2`) There cannot be any individuated tropes that are not located.  
Whether (2) follows from (2`) is actually an interesting and controversial question. Those who 
would deny this inference would hold that there could be un-individuated things, such as ‘stuffs’. 
This possibility is denied by those who advance the Quinean slogan “no entity without identity”. 
For further discussion, see Parsons, Terence (1987). “Entities without identity.” Philosophical 
Perspectives 1: 1-19.  
Denying the move from (1) to (2), however, is not a suitable way to subvert Campbell’s 
materialist conclusion. If (2`) were substituted for (2), it would still follow that there cannot be 
any individuated immaterial entities. This would eliminate individual Cartesian minds, individual 
angels, etc. I will therefore follow Campbell in supposing that (2) follows from (1).   
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Campbell however recognizes that this argument seems “too swift, too dismissive.” 
Many competent philosophers have defended not just the possibility, but also the 
actuality of immaterial entities. And I certainly do not see any metaphysical 
impossibility in the existence of some proposed immaterial entities. Campbell thinks 
that he can allow for the possibility of immaterial entities, at least insofar as there is 
some analogue of spatiotemporal location through which they can be individuated:  
 
There is, in fact, a less drastic possibility open. That is, to the extent that there 
can be non-spatial particulars, to that extent there must be some analogue of the 
locational order of space. And in that case, there will be an analogue of location 
to serve as the principal of individuation for non-spatial abstract particulars. 
(486)  
 
Campbell elaborates on just what these analogues might be elsewhere.4 For example, a 
platonic cardinal number would be individuated by “the mathematical ‘place’ of its 
corresponding ordinal.” This seems acceptable. So, at this point, Campbell would reject 
(4) and replace it with:  
 
(4`) Immaterial* entities are not located, where immaterial* beings are a subset of 
immaterial beings that cannot be located even by any analogue of spatiotemporal 
location. He can therefore accept the possibility of all immaterial beings that are not 
immaterial* beings. 
 
III. Immaterialist Intuitions  
 
The problem, though, is that some immaterial* beings seem possible. Campbell 
discusses angels, and proposes that we might be able to individuate them by such 
features as “the intensity of their powers, or the dates of the events they remembered, or 
the speed of their decision-taking.”5 But it seems quite possible that two distinct angels 
could have exactly the same powers, remember the same events, and make decisions at 
the same speed. So angels may be immaterial* beings.  
 
Further, it in general seems possible to me that there could be two fully indiscernible 
immaterial entities, intrinsically the same in every respect, yet still distinct. This 
intuition seems to have fully the same force as the intuition that Campbell has that there 
could be a world with just two uniform spheres in a non-absolute space. If this is so, 
then there are possibly immaterial* beings, for no indiscernible pair of immaterial 
beings could be individuated by an analogue of spatiotemporal location.  
 
                                                          
4 See Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars chapter 3 (Oxford, 1990). 
5 Campbell actually dismisses these as “too extrinsic” to plausibly individuate the angels.  
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IV. Locational Individuation Formulated  
 
So my modal intuitions tell me that there could be immaterial* beings, thus Campbell’s 
argument must have gone wrong somewhere. But I don’t intend to challenge 
Campbell’s trope theory. Rather, I will try to cast doubt on the individuation principle 
expressed by (1). It will be helpful here to have this individuation principle expressed 
formally. I take this formulation from Schaffer (249):6  
 
SI: x and y are distinct tropes iff they are either not exactly resembling, or at distant 
locations (D(x,y)>0).  
 
It might be thought that SI is immediately defeated by inter-world trope relations. Most 
conceptions of possible worlds hold that each world is spatiotemporally disconnected 
from each other possible world. Consider, then, two possible worlds: the actual world, 
W1, and a possible world, W2, exactly similar to the actual world but with the 
counterfactual supposition of a 5 degree drop in temperature today. I have one blue pen 
on top of my desk and one blue pen in my desk drawer in W1. Therefore, there is also a 
blue pen on top of my counterpart’s desk and a blue pen in my counterpart’s desk 
drawer in W2. On the trope theory, there is a trope of blueness for each of these pens in 
W1 and W2. Certainly the trope of blueness associated with the pen on my desk in W1 
is distinct from the trope of blueness associated with the pen in my counterpart’s desk 
drawer in W2. However, SI says that these tropes are not distinct. For both tropes are 
blueness tropes, hence they do resemble, and they are not at distant locations, for they 
are in no spatiotemporal relation at all.  
 
Schaffer accounts for this by distinguishing between inter- and intra-world principles of 
individuation. By SI, it is meant only that, “within a given world, no two exactly 
resembling tropes are at zero distance.” On Schaffer’s account, tropes at different 
worlds are always distinct, though tropes can have counterparts at different worlds.  
 
V. The Multiverse Objection to Locational Individuation  
 
While this is an acceptable stopgap for inter-world trope relations, SI will also be 
defeated by the possibility of an intra-world multiverse. What I have in mind is the idea 
that a given possible world might consist in many spatiotemporally disconnected 
universes. This seems to be a metaphysical possibility, and even an epistemic 
possibility for the actual world.7  
                                                          
6 Schaffer, Jonathan (2001). “The individuation of tropes.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
79 (2): 247–257. 
7 It should be emphasized however that these must be genuinely spatiotemporally disconnected 
universes; not just any multiverse will do. The multiverse posited by the ‘many-worlds 
interpretation’ of quantum mechanics, for example, would not defeat SI as each of the ‘many-
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If the actual world, or any possible world, consists in multiple spatiotemporally 
disconnected universes, then SI will fail as an intra-world principle of trope 
individuation. For any two distinct but resembling tropes p and q across two universes 
within a world, SI will say that p and q are not distinct. For p and q do resemble, and it 
is not the case that D(p,q)>0. 
 
VI. Locational Individuation Reformulated  
 
This issue can, I think, be resolved for the defender of a locational individuation of 
tropes. All we need to do is amend SI slightly:  
 
SI`: x and y are distinct tropes if they are either not exactly resembling, or not 
collocated (¬(D(x,y)=0)).  
 
Now if we feed in p and q into SI`, p and q will come out distinct, as they should, 
because p and q are not collocated. Indeed, for any x and y across two spatiotemporally 
disconnected universes, x and y are not collocated, hence are distinct according to SI`. 
In addition, SI` will still have the result that, within a given continuous track of 
spacetime, no two exactly resembling tropes are at zero distance.  
 
Another advantage of SI` is that it will serve as both an intra- and an inter-world 
principle of individuation. For, unlike SI, it rightly gives the result that strict trans-
world identity is impossible, as no pair of tropes in different worlds are collocated. It is 
still open to the trope theorist, however, to adopt a counterpart theory on which tropes 
in different worlds can be ‘the same’ in a looser sense.  
 
Unfortunately, SI` still has the consequence that there cannot possibly be any 
immaterial* entities. The problem is that immaterial* tropes are not collocated with 
themselves (they are not located at all, even analogously). Thus, if we have a Cartesian 
mind with an immaterial* trope of happiness, we could give that trope two names, say 
Y and Z. Y is, of course, identical to Z. But according to SI`, Y and Z and distinct, 
because they are not collocated. This contradiction shows that SI` is incompatible with 
the possibility of immaterial* beings. 
 
VII. The Swapping Objection to Locational Individuation  
 
Let me then present a different objection to the locational individuation of tropes. It 
concerns the possibility of what is known in the literature as swapping. Consider again 
the two blue pens I have at my desk. We may ask the question of whether it is possible 
that the trope of blueness of the pen on top of my desk be swapped with the trope of 
                                                                                                                                              
worlds’ are part of the same wave function and are in spatiotemporal relations. I thank Jonathan 
Schaffer for discussion on this point. 
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blueness of the pen in my desk drawer. D.M. Armstrong and Schaffer maintain that this 
is an empty possibility, not really a genuinely distinct alternative. While it is true that a 
trope swap would change nothing in the “empirical or causal situation”, this does not 
show that it does not represent a distinct possibility. If the world were a dream in the 
mind of God,8 that would change nothing in the empirical or causal description of the 
observed world, but it is a genuine alternative to reality objectively being as it is 
observed. The locational individuation of tropes would make swapping not a genuine 
possibility. Allow the proponent of the locational individuation of tropes to help 
themselves to a counterpart theory of transworld identity, based upon similarity with 
respect to resemblance and distance relations. Consider two tropes A and B at locations 
x and y respectively in a possible world W1, and consider a swapped possible world 
W2 where A is at y and B is at x. Ignoring that we have given them the same name, the 
counterpart of A at W1 is in fact not A at W2, for B at W2 is more similar to A at W1 
with respect to its distance and resemblance relations. Hence there has effectively been 
no swap. These are not two distinct possibilities.  
 
This seems to me count against individuating tropes by location. I think that taking 
seriously Campbell’s conception of tropes as fully capable of independent existence 
requires that swapping be possible. Campbell maintains that the trope theory, in 
positing tropes as fundamental, requires that disassociated tropes, such as “free-floating 
sounds and smells” be at least possible. This seems to show that swapping, over time, is 
possible. Hereafter I will refer to a state-of-affairs in a world W at a time tx as Sx. 
Consider again the tropes A and B at locations x and y respectively in a possible world 
W at S1. Now suppose that A and B are both resembling free-floating sounds. Suppose 
that each free-floating sound moves along incrementally over 5 discrete moments of 
times and each comes to inhabit the location of the other trope, such that at S5, A is at y 
and B is at x. Suppose that all of the other distance relations in W are the same at S5 as 
they were at S1 (though they may be different at S2-S4). Plainly, S1 and S5 must be 
recognized as genuinely distinct states-of-affairs. The correct description of W is one in 
which A and B incrementally moved into each other’s location. At each time on the 
interval of t1 through t5, A and B are moving closer to y and x respectively. At t5, 
when A reaches y, it does not somehow suddenly become B, magically preventing the 
gradual swap.  
 
But just how are the states-of-affairs S1 and S5 to be distinguished if we individuate 
tropes locationally? All of the resemblance and distance relations between tropes at S1 
seem to be the exact same as all of the resemblance and distance relations between 
tropes at S5. The proponent of SI` has the means to distinguish between S1 and S5, 
however, by pointing out that distance relations are spatiotemporal, not merely spatial. 
                                                          
8 See Lebens, Samuel (2015). “God and his imaginary friends: a Hassidic metaphysics.” 
Religious Studies 51 (2): 183-204.  
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Since the tropes at S1 are temporally closer to the tropes at S2 than are the tropes at S5, 
S1 and S5 can be distinguished within W.  
 
The problem is that once S1 and S5 are admitted as distinct and possible states-of-
affairs, there seem to be possible worlds where they cannot be distinguished by 
temporal relations. Consider a world consisting only of S1 and world consisting only of 
S5. These worlds seem to be possible. We could run subtraction arguments on W to the 
conclusion that there are possible worlds consisting of only S1 and only of S5.9 In these 
worlds, the distance and resemblance relations among all of the tropes are truly the 
same: there are no differences in temporal relations by which the locationalist can 
distinguish S1 from S5. The locationalist should now point out that tropes A and B are 
in fact not swapped in these worlds on their account. By the same reasoning we used to 
show that the locationalist account disallows swapping, we can show that the 
counterpart of A in the world containing only S1 is in fact B in the world containing 
only S5. For again, B in the S5 world, being located at x, is more similar to A in the S1 
world with respect to its distance and resemblance relations than is A in the S5 world, 
which is located at y. My point, however, is exactly that this result of the locationalist 
account is false. If we accepted that A and B were swapped between S1 and S5 in W, 
why would it be plausible to suppose that these states metaphysically collapse just by 
existing alone? I am suggesting that the locationalist account has gotten this result 
wrong. 
 
VIII. Primitive Quantitative Individuation  
 
What we rather need to account for swapping is an individuation principle through 
which the distinction between A and B is simply taken as primitive. Witness what 
Schaffer (248) rejects:  
 
QI: x and y are distinct tropes iff they are primitively quantitatively distinct.  
                                                          
9 See Baldwin, Thomas (1996). “There might be nothing.” Analysis 56 (4): 231–238. The 
argument would roughly be:  
1. For all S in W except for [S1 or S5], S could fail to exist.  
2. For all S in W except for [S1 or S5], the non-existence of S does not necessitate the existence 
of any other S.  
3. For all S in W except for [S1 or S5], the non-existence of S does not necessitate the non-
existence of [S1 or S5].  
From these premises we could conclude that there is a possible world consisting solely of S1, and 
a possible world consisting solely of S5. I do not intend to elaborate on or defend this argument 
here. I merely note it to add more weight to the already plausible suggestion that there are 
possible worlds consisting of only S1 and only of S5. 
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But if this is so then tropes are not to be individuated by location. The immaterialist can 
then simply reject (1) in Campbell’s materialist argument, and allow for the possibility 
of individuated immaterial tropes through primitive quantitative distinction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
